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In recent years, political philosophers have been fiercely arguing over the virtues and 
vices of utopian vs realistic theorizing. Partly due to the lack of a common and 
consistently used vocabulary, these debates have become rather confusing. In this 
chapter, I attempt to bring some clarity to them and, in doing so, I offer a conciliatory 
perspective on the “utopian vs realistic theorizing” controversy. I argue that, once the 
notion of a normative or evaluative theory is clearly defined and distinguished from 
the desiderata that any good theory should satisfy, many of the disagreements 
between supporters and opponents of “utopian” or “ideal” theorizing can be easily 
dissolved. I conclude that, in general, political philosophers should be cautious when 
theorizing at the extreme ends of the “utopian-realistic” spectrum, but that, setting 
extremes aside, the correct level of realism or idealism depends on the particular 
question a theory aims to address. 
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Introduction 
David Estlund (2008, chap. 14; 2011; 2014) has recently argued against an attitude in 
political philosophy he calls “utopophobia.” Utopophobes, in Estlund’s 
understanding, problematically compromise normative principles in order to 
accommodate empirical realities. If it turns out that people are unlikely to conform 
with what morality requires, utopophobes let them off the moral hook.  
While Estlund worries about utopophobia, other political philosophers are 
concerned about an altogether different pathology within the discipline: what one 
might call “factophobia.” By “factophobia,” I mean the tendency to elaborate 
normative principles under deeply counter-factual assumptions. This tendency, it is 
argued, results in the development of normative principles that are either misguided or 
counter-productive in real-world circumstances (e.g. Farrelly 2007; Mills 2005; 
Galston 2010; for an overview see Valentini 2009).  
 “Utopophobia” and “factophobia” have in fact been at the heart of recent 
methodological debates in political philosophy: specifically, though not exclusively, 
debates about justice.1 These debates—to which I have myself contributed (so, I 
suppose, I am not excused!)—have become rather messy.2 My aim in this chapter is 
                                                
∗ I am grateful to the participants in the workshops on Political Utopias (Bowling Green, April 2014) 
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1 In the rest of the chapter, I too shall be focusing on justice. Several of the conclusions I reach, though, 
can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other areas of political philosophy. 
2 The relevant debates are often referred to as those concerning “ideal vs non-ideal” or “realistic vs 
idealistic” theorizing.  
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to bring some clarity to them, by systematizing and evaluating the different ways in 
which a theory of justice might be “utopophobic” (and, conversely, “factophobic”).  
I suggest that much of what I have called the “messiness” of current debates 
stems from the fact that these debates—and the discipline of political 
theory/philosophy more generally—lack a well-defined notion of what a theory of 
justice is. Once such a notion is developed, and clearly distinguished from the 
desiderata that any good theory of justice should satisfy, we will be in a better 
position to both establish what charges of utopophobia (and factophobia) actually 
mean and assess them. In other words, we will be in a better position to determine 
what utopophobes (and, conversely, factophobes) are afraid of, and to evaluate if and 
when their “phobias” are justified. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. In Section I, partly drawing on joint work 
with Christian List, I offer a definition of a theory of justice, and lay out a number of 
desiderata that a good theory of justice should meet. In the subsequent sections, I 
distinguish and evaluate six different ways in which a theory of justice might be 
called “utopophobic” (or, conversely, “factophobic”) and assess them. I conclude that, 
for most of the lines of debate I discuss, utopophobes and factophobes are either 
quarrelling for no good reason, since their views are ultimately compatible, or both 
wrong in holding uncompromising positions located at one or the other end of the 
methodological spectrum. This conclusion, in turn, points in the direction of a more 
balanced approach to theorizing about justice which, following Rawls (1999b), we 
might call “realistically utopian.”  
 
I. What Is a Theory of Justice? 
The notion of a theory of justice, or of a theory more generally, is often invoked in 
contemporary discussions in moral and political philosophy. What exactly this notion 
refers to, however, remains unclear. When mentioning the idea of a theory of justice, 
most think of Rawls’s (1971/1999a) “justice as fairness” or Nozick’s (1974) 
“historical entitlement theory of justice,” but a clear picture of what makes something 
(i) “a theory” and (ii) “of justice” is missing.  
 
I.i Descriptive, normative, and evaluative theories 
So, what is a theory? Christian List and I have recently argued that a theory may be 
best characterized as a set of propositions playing a given functional role in an 
agent’s conceptualization of the world (List and Valentini forthcoming). 3  This 
functional role varies from theory to theory.  
Theories that are explanatory or predictive—e.g. positive physical, biological, 
or social-scientific theories—aim to account for or predict empirical phenomena. For 
instance, Newton’s theory of physics is explanatory in this sense. Theories that are 
evaluative or normative, by contrast, aim to evaluate empirical phenomena, or guide 
our actions in the light of normative principles.4 Specifically, a theory is normative 
when its constitutive propositions contain deontic operators like “ought,” “should,” 
“must,” “may”; and it is evaluative when its propositions contain evaluative 
predicates like “just,” “unjust,” “good,” “bad,” “fair,” “unfair.” Rawls’s theory of 
justice, for example, is arguably both evaluative and normative in this sense: it tells us 
                                                
3 The present subsection draws on this joint work. 
4 For recent discussion of the normative/prescriptive vs evaluative contrast, see Gilabert (2011) and 
Tomlin (2012, 42). 
 3 
under what conditions society is just (evaluation), and sets out duties falling on 
society’s major institutional structures, namely “the state” (prescription). 
Finally, it is customary for theories—whether evaluative or normative—to be 
expressed in axiomatic form or, more informally stated, in the form of general 
principles—as opposed to a long list of propositions. For example, if we again 
consider Rawls’s theory of justice, this is constituted by all the propositions implied 
by the equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity and difference principles, in 
conjunction with empirical assumptions about the society to which the principles are 
applied in any given instance. 
 
I.ii Theories of justice 
As anticipated, theories of justice naturally fall within the normative or evaluative 
realm. In its more general form, justice concerns what agents are owed. More 
specifically, (many of) the theories of justice developed in contemporary political 
philosophy tend to focus on individuals’ rightfully enforceable entitlements, namely 
those entitlements (rights5) that may be legitimately enforced by the state or other 
coercive bodies.  
 Theories of justice so conceived may be domain-specific. We can 
meaningfully talk, for instance, about justice at the international level, and justice 
within the state; justice within the family and justice at the workplace. I am here 
assuming that the greatest common denominator of all such discussions about justice 
is reference to what the agents involved are entitled to. 
In addition, the propositions constituting a theory of justice may be formulated 
in either normative terms (e.g. “Each agent ought to X”) or in evaluative terms (e.g. 
“A state of affairs is just if and only if X is the case”).  
An illustration of these different types of theories of justice, already expressed 
in “axiomatized” form, is offered in the table below.  
 
 Evaluative  Normative  
Domestic justice “Socio-economic inequalities 
among members of society 
are just if, and only if, they 
are to the greatest benefit of 
the least well off.” 
“The state ought only to 
allow those socio-economic 
inequalities that are to the 
greatest benefit of the least-
well off.” 
Global justice “The global order is just if, 
and only if, nobody in the 
world is worse off through no 
fault of their own.” 
“Each individual in the world 
ought to do what they can to 
ensure that nobody is worse 
off through no fault of their 
own.” 
 
I.iii Desiderata on a good theory of justice 
Theories of justice need to be carefully distinguished from the desiderata that they 
should satisfy. A completely absurd theory of justice—one we would never adopt—
still qualifies as a theory of justice if it exhibits the formal characteristics described in 
the previous section (List and Valentini forthcoming).  
 A good theory of justice is not merely one displaying those formal 
characteristics, but one that also meets a number of important desiderata. In what 
follows, I outline a few candidate desiderata that—at least for most theorists—a good 
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account of justice should meet. The list is not exhaustive, but suffices for illustrative 
purposes. 
 
• Internal coherence: A good theory of justice must be internally coherent; 
namely, it must not contain contradictory propositions.  
 
• Consistency with “ought implies can”: A good normative (though not a 
purely evaluative) theory of justice must set out demands that its addressees 
can fulfil. For example, arguably, a normative theory of justice that required 
each state not only to minimize the incidence of crime, but to eliminate it 
altogether, would fail to satisfy this desideratum. It is in fact not within the 
power of any existing (or realistically possible) state to control its citizens to 
such an extent as to guarantee that no crime is ever committed.   
 
• Fit with evidence: A good theory of justice must “fit” the relevant evidence. 
For many theorists, the evidence in question is constituted by our most 
strongly held considered judgements about what people are owed. For 
example, a theory of justice according to which convicting the innocent turned 
out to be sometimes just would fail to fit our evidence, namely our strongly 
held judgement that convicting the innocent is always unjust. This, in turn, 
would count against the theory (cf. McDermott 2008). 
 
• Explanatory power: A good theory of justice must not only “fit” the relevant 
evidence, but do so in an explanatorily powerful way, namely for the right 
reasons. For instance, a theory that fits the judgement that convicting the 
innocent is always unjust, but explains this injustice solely by reference to the 
associated “unnecessary” costs to the penal system is unsatisfactory. Surely, it 
is the violation of the rights of the innocent that explains the wrong of 
convicting them. 
 
• Parsimony: All other things being equal, a very parsimonious theory (i.e. one 
with simpler propositions/a less complex system of axioms) is better, namely 
more useful and tractable, than a less parsimonious one. 
 
With these preliminary remarks in hand, I now proceed to survey some of the claims 
made in the debate on ideal/utopian vs non-ideal/realistic political theory, interpret 
them in the light of the above characterization of a theory, and assess their cogency.  
 
II. Utopophobia and Factophobia 
As anticipated, by “utopophobia” and “factophobia” I refer to two broad attitudes in 
political theorizing. But who, exactly, may be said to display the former, and who the 
latter, attitude? 
Utopophobes: This amusing label has been coined by Estlund (2008, chap. 
14), in the context of his discussion of democratic theory. I am here borrowing it, and 
giving it a less technical, broader meaning, to refer to a wide variety of theorists who 
share a general attitude in thinking about justice—or anyway have been perceived to 
do so in the literature. Utopophobes—the label says it—”fear the impossible, 
idealistic, and highly unlikely.” In their views, theorizing about justice should be 
anchored to existing factual realities. Grand theories that abstract away from the 
messiness, limitations, and pathologies of the world in which we live, so utopophobes 
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argue, are either useless or counterproductive. The group of utopophobes includes 
critics of Rawlsian ideal theory such as Charles Mills (2005) and Thomas McCarthy 
(2004), proponents of a comparative, social-choice theoretic approach such as 
Amartya Sen (2009), realists about political theory such as William Galston (2010) 
and Bernard Williams (2005), and political philosophers with conventionalist leanings 
such as David Miller (2013, chap. 1).6 
Factophobes: The theorists I label “factophobes” fear that, by remaining 
anchored to existing real-world facts, theories of justice might either fail to capture 
what justice fundamentally is, or become a-critical, and defend the status quo rather 
than offer a perspective from which to evaluate it. Once again, factophobes are a 
disparate group of thinkers, and their claims are equally diverse: they range from G.A. 
Cohen’s (2003; 2008) defence of fact-free principles of justice, to Estlund’s (2011) 
denial that facts about human motivation should constrain political philosophy, to 
Ronald Dworkin’s (2000) appeal to “the ideal ideal world” in his design of principles 
of justice.  
Interestingly, John Rawls does not seem to fit either of these two categories 
neatly. Neither factophobes, nor utopophobes would consider him “one of their own.” 
Utopophobes have vehemently criticised his theory of justice—whether in A Theory 
of Justice or in Political Liberalism—for being excessively idealised, and 
insufficiently attentive to the nature of real-world politics (Farrelly 2007; Galston 
2010; Williams 2005). Factophobes have equally attacked Rawls for his alleged 
excessive reliance on facts—about pluralism, human motivation and selfishness—in 
the design of his normative theories (e.g. Cohen 2000; Pogge 2001).  
This shows how the line between the two stances in political philosophy is not 
an easy one to draw. Still, many contemporary debates operate on the assumption that 
a meaningful line can, and should, be drawn. In what follows, I too engage in line-
drawing, by considering various claims made by theorists in both camps, and relating 
them back to my definition of a theory of justice. This will allow me to clarify the 
nature of the disagreement between the two camps, and establish which side is, in 
relation to any given dimension of the disagreement, closest to the truth. I organize 
my discussion in two parts. In section III, I consider lines of disagreement between 
utopophobes and factophobes concerning the nature and structure of a plausible 
theory of justice. In section IV, I turn to disagreements concerning the desiderata a 
good theory of justice should satisfy. 
 
III. Utopophobia, Factophobia and the Nature of a Theory of Justice 
Three important lines of debate between utopophobes and factophobes can be 
helpfully recast as concerning the nature and structure of a theory of justice, and 
specifically of its underlying principles. These lines of debate focus on: (i) the scope 
of a theory of justice (i.e., wide vs narrow); (ii) the function of a theory of justice 
(evaluative vs normative); and (iii) the form of a theory of justice (categorical vs 
comparative).  
 
III.i The scope of a theory of justice 
                                                
6 What most fundamentally marks out “realism in political theory”—defended by theorists like Galston 
and Williams—though, is not its sensitivity to real-world facts, but its attempt to establish the political 
realm as a sui generis domain of normative analysis. In the case of political realism (strictly 
conceived), then, sensitivity to real-world political facts comes as a byproduct of the attempt to 
establish the normative autonomy of the political. For discussion, see Rossi and Sleat (2014, 690).   
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Some of the disagreements between “utopophobes” and “factophobes” are ultimately 
traceable to differences in what theorists in each camp believe the scope of a 
normative or evaluative theory of justice should be (see the discussion in Elster 2011). 
By “scope” I mean the range of possible circumstances to which the prescriptions (or 
evaluations) contained in the theory apply.7 To clarify, let us take a normative 
principle, expressed in conditional form: “Whenever circumstance X obtains, one 
ought to Y.” The consequent of the conditional expresses the principle’s prescription 
(p). The scope of the principle is set by the content of the antecedent, which 
determines when its prescriptions apply. 
Consider the following three principles.  
 
• P1: “Whenever a state is marked by deep-seated racial prejudices, (p1) it 
ought to adopt affirmative-action policies.” 
• P2: “Whenever there is a state, (p2) it ought to secure equality of opportunity 
for its members.” 
• P3: “Whenever there are agents, (p3) they ought to do what they reasonably 
can to ensure that nobody is worse off through no fault of their own.” 
 
Principles P1, P2 and P3 are universal: the truth of the relevant conditionals 
(assuming they are true) is independent of whether their respective antecedents are 
satisfied or not. But what I have called their scopes differ. Prescription p1 only 
applies in circumstances where states exist and are marked by deep-seated racial 
prejudices. Prescription p2 applies to any existing state, whether marked by prejudices 
or not. Prescription p3 applies to any set of agents, independently of whether any state 
exists. In other words, the scope of P1 is narrower than that of P2, which is in turn 
narrower than that of P3.  
 The scope of a theory of justice—namely, the range of circumstances to which 
its prescriptions apply—then, is a matter of degree. On one end of the spectrum lie 
those who believe that theorizing about justice should deliver prescriptions that are 
applicable across all possible configurations of facts—namely, closer to P3 (Cohen 
2008; for elaboration on this, see the helpful discussion in Pogge 2008, 463). On this 
view, fundamentally, principles of justice should not contain demanding factual 
antecedents. The presence or absence of certain facts should make no difference to the 
applicability of their prescriptions. The prescriptions delivered by scope-restricted 
principles are mere applications of fundamental, “fact-free” principles. 
The three principles offered above illustrate this: P3 is the more 
“fundamental/fact-free” principle which, in conjunction with a certain set of factual 
assumptions, supports, respectively, prescriptions p2 and p1. For instance, a state’s 
duty to institute affirmative action policies may be described as following from a 
more fundamental principle of luck-equality (P3), applied to circumstances 
characterized by racial prejudices. Those who insist that the scope of theories of 
justice should be maximally wide believe that only principles of wide scope can tell 
us what justice really demands. For them, a theory of justice that contains only 
heavily scope-restricted principles is superficial and explanatorily deficient: it does 
not tell us why we ought to act in this or that way (Cohen 2003).  
On the other end of the spectrum lie those who argue that theories of justice 
should concentrate on reducing “local” injustices, by proposing feasible 
                                                
7 In the rest of this subsection I discuss this distinction focusing on normative theories, but the same 
conclusions would follow for evaluative ones. 
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improvements of existing institutions, when these exhibit obvious moral failures 
(Wiens 2012; cf. Sen 2009). For these scholars, the scope of theories of justice is 
rather narrow—closer to P1. Their proposed prescriptions are meant to apply only to 
specific situations. By their very construction, such narrow-scope theories tend to be 
normatively silent about cases that are factually different from those they are 
explicitly meant to address. From this perspective, the primary aim of a theory of 
justice is to tell us what to do to make our world more just, and the search for 
principles of wide scope—whose prescriptions apply to worlds different from ours— 
is simply unnecessary for this task.  
 Should we favour one end of the spectrum, i.e. either a wide scope or a narrow 
one? I believe not. Theories of justice—namely, theories about what agents are 
owed—may legitimately have different scopes, depending on the particular question 
they ask. For instance, a good theory of “justice between states” is, by definition, one 
whose scope is restricted to a world of states. It would be surprising if its 
prescriptions were applicable even in worlds where the state, as an institution, no 
longer existed. Similarly, a theory setting out prescriptions aimed at improving the 
justice of the health-care system of the UK is probably not going to deliver 
prescriptions applicable to contexts different from the British one. By contrast, a 
general theory of social justice (like Rawls’s) is going to set out prescriptions the 
applicability of which extends beyond a particular context, encompassing a variety of 
different societies.  
 Since all of the questions motivating these theories are meaningful and 
important, so are the theories answering them. The suggestion, or implication, that 
there might be a “correct scope” for a theory of justice seems misguided. Having said 
that, I would like to express a word of caution in relation to myopic engagement with 
theorizing on the two extreme ends of the spectrum only.  
 Theorizing on the most ambitious extreme, by wanting the prescriptions 
contained in a theory of justice to be applicable “independently of the facts,” is risky. 
Specifically, it is likely to deliver empty or uninformative normative principles—a 
charge that critics of G. A. Cohen’s style of political philosophy have often levelled 
against their target (Pogge 2008). For example, P3—”Whenever there are agents, (p3) 
they ought to do what they reasonably can to ensure that nobody is worse off through 
no fault of their own”—says very little about what people should do in the real world, 
such as what immigration policies a state should adopt, what system of redistributive 
taxation it should implement and so on. And giving this principle more concrete 
content is not merely a matter of “automatic application” to given contexts, it requires 
first-order moral theorizing—e.g. about where the line between choice and chance is 
to be drawn, what welfare amounts to, and so forth. What Cohen calls first or 
fundamental principles of justice are thus likely to be somewhat empty or 
uninformative.8 Note that this is not just a “practical” concern, but a theoretical one: a 
normative principle whose articulation across various circumstances is underspecified 
has no “full” meaning (cf. Ronzoni 2010, 93ff.).9  
Conversely, a narrow focus on how specific institutions might be improved, or 
made more just, without reference to principles of wide scope, might be explanatorily 
deficient as well as practically counter-productive. For example, in order to know 
how to best design affirmative action policies, and when to discontinue them, we need 
                                                
8 Cf. Sangiovanni’s (forthcoming, online early, 18) remarks about the open-textured nature of “higher 
level values and principles.”  
9 I will further qualify this conclusion towards the end of section IV.iii. 
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to know in virtue of what general principle of justice they should be adopted. One 
such principle could be P2 (demanding equal opportunities), but other candidate 
principles could be “the state ought always to maximize aggregate happiness” (on the 
assumption that, when prejudices are deep-seated, affirmative action contributes to 
doing just that), or “whenever there is a state, it ought to ensure that every social 
group is equally, or proportionately, represented in positions of advantage.” Theories 
of justice with narrow scope, then, do well to keep “wider” principles in sight, in 
order to offer better-informed prescriptions.  
 In sum, the narrow-wide dichotomy is a matter of degree, and there are as 
many “admissible scopes” in theorizing about justice as there are interesting questions 
about justice. Except for cautioning theorists of justice not to gravitate exclusively 
around one end of the spectrum or the other—which is precisely what “extreme” 
utopophobes and factophobes do—no real “winners” or “losers” can be identified in 
relation to this line of debate. 
 
III.ii The function of a theory of justice 
Another line of disagreement between utopophobes and factophobes concerns the 
function of a theory of justice, and specifically whether this can be purely evaluative, 
or whether it must also be normative. The “disagreement” most often traces back to 
disputes about the meaning of the concept of justice (Gheaus 2013). For some 
theorists (on the utopophobic side), invocation of the idea of justice always requires 
reference to actual rights and duties. Saying that a certain state of affairs is unjust, for 
them, implies that (i) someone’s rights have been violated and (ii) some agent has 
failed to act on the duties correlative to those rights. In other words, statements about 
justice taking an evaluative form can be straightforwardly translated into statements 
about justice taking a normative one (and vice versa). 
For other theorists, this is not so. A state of affairs may be meaningfully 
described as unjust, with nobody having culpably caused it, and nobody being in a 
position to remedy it. In this case, there are claims about injustice that carry no 
normative implications, but only evaluative ones. To see this, consider the following 
two-people world: 
 
Tim and Tom: Tim and Tom are stranded on two separate islands. Tim has 
plenty of food, water and resources. Tom lives in conditions of dire need. 
Their difference in resources and wellbeing is a sheer matter of luck. What is 
more, it is literally physically impossible for Tim to transfer resources over to 
Tom, or for Tom to move to Tim’s island. 
 
What should we say about Tim and Tom’s situation? For theorists who believe that 
justice can be purely evaluative, it makes sense to say that Tim and Tom’s situation is 
unjust. What this means is that there is something to be regretted in the status quo, 
such that, if it could be remedied, it ought to be, as a matter of justice—namely of 
“right” (cf. Gilabert 2011, 56).10 For theorists who believe that claims about justice by 
necessity involve reference to actual (as opposed to counterfactual) rights and duties, 
Tim and Tom’s situation might be regrettable, but not unjust (cf. Gheaus 2013; for 
further discussion see Mason 2004, 254; Farrelly 2007).  
 Is there a genuine debate to be had here? Probably not—both positions are 
plausible, and the “disagreement” between them revolves around a stipulation about 
                                                
10 Again, throughout, I am assuming that claims about justice have to do with rights. 
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what might plausibly fall under the label “justice.” To be sure, there may be strategic 
reasons for wanting to use justice only in relation to key rights and duties, without 
over-expanding its reach. If matters of justice are meant to be particularly serious, and 
are typically thought to convey wrongdoing, in order not to rob this term of its moral 
force, we should probably use it only sparingly in a purely evaluative sense.11 Still, as 
long as one is clear about the sense in which one is using the notion of justice and 
why, I find it unnecessary to take a stand on whether this notion may only refer to 
normative, or also to purely evaluative, claims. Relatively little hinges on 
terminological legislation after all.12   
 
III.iii The form of a theory of justice 
Another line of debate, initiated by Amartya Sen (2006; 2009), concerns the form that 
an evaluative theory of justice—and specifically its underlying principles—should 
have. In his recent critique of mainstream, Rawlsian political theory, Sen has argued 
(in a “utopophobic fashion”) for an approach to political philosophy in which theories 
of justice do not focus on the ideal of a perfectly just society, but instead provide tools 
for comparing different social states. Comparisons, Sen plausibly argues, are what we 
need most when it comes to making the world more just. The ideal of a perfectly just 
society is irrelevant for this purpose.  
 Setting aside the question of whether Sen’s prime target (Rawls) is indeed 
guilty of what Sen accuses him of (for critiques see Valentini 2011; Gilabert 2012), 
the distinction he points to, namely that between “transcendental” (which I shall label 
“categorical”) and “comparative” theories is a real one.13 Specifically, a categorical 
theory of justice takes the form: “A society is perfectly just if and only if it satisfies 
the following requirements.” A comparative theory, by contrast, takes the form: 
“Society X is more/less just than society Y if and only if it satisfies the following 
requirements.” On the categorical account, society is either just or unjust. On the 
comparative one, there are many degrees of justice and injustice. 
 Is there a “correct” way of thinking about justice? Once again, and perhaps 
disappointingly by now, I do not think there is. Let me explain. Of course, on some 
views the form of principles of justice is necessarily “comparative.” For instance, a 
classical utilitarian theory says: “The greater the sum-total utility, the more just 
society is.” In principle, there is no limit to how just a society can be—at least from a 
purely evaluative point of view (Valentini 2011, 305).14  
However, to the extent that we take rights and duties to be central to justice—
as I have done in this chapter—we have reason to believe that there is in principle 
such a thing as a “fully just” state of affairs such that we could not conceive of an 
even more just one. This is a state of affairs in which everyone’s rights are 
                                                
11 One possibility might be to refer to “purely evaluative justice” as “proto-justice.” 
12 In this respect, I have somewhat softened my views compared to Valentini (2012), although I would 
still insist that ceasing to associate justice with “rights” (whether actual or hypothetical) would be 
unhelpful and deprive the term of its distinctiveness. 
13 I find the notion of “transcendental theorizing” misleading in this context, since it suggests that the 
theories in question appeal to, or presuppose, a reality beyond the empirical world. This, however, is 
not what Sen has in mind, despite his choice of terminology. Sen’s targets are theories for which the 
world is either (fully) just or (fully) unjust, as opposed to being characterized by “degrees” of 
(in)justice.  
14 There are, of course, “practical” limits to the total utility that may be achieved at any given time, and 
hence to how just we can make society (in a normative sense) at any given time. 
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respected.15 And if justice is a matter of rights, then it is important for a theory of 
justice to set out the conditions under which everyone’s rights are respected, such that 
we can call that state of affairs fully just.  
 Having said that, though, Sen and other critics of “categorical/ideal” 
theorizing are right in emphasizing that the “categorical” can only take us so far, and 
that a complete, informative, and helpful theory of justice should also enable us to 
make comparisons between states of affairs and identify justice-improvements. 
Knowing what a fully just society would look like is clearly not sufficient for that. If 
theorizing about justice remained only categorical, then, it would be of little use—
though certainly of theoretical, and some practical, interest.  
Where Sen goes wrong, however, is in suggesting that an interest in 
comparisons can do without any reference to the ideal. In order to decide which 
“local” improvements in justice we should favour, and how they should be brought 
about, we need to make reference to the underlying, general, and “categorical” 
principles of justice telling us what people’s rights and duties are. Again, our 
comparative theory might tell us that: “A state marked by a past of racial injustice that 
adopts affirmative action policies is more just than an identical society that does not.” 
Yet, to understand why this is the case, and in turn make sure that our reforms lead us 
in the right direction, we need a rough idea of what more general principle of justice 
underpins this comparative statement (on this see Simmons 2010, 35); this will give 
our theory greater explanatory robustness. What counts as a full justice-improvement 
will vary depending on whether “full justice” demands equal representation of groups, 
substantive equality of opportunity for individuals, or formal equality of opportunity 
coupled with rectification for its past denial.  
 Here too, then, there are no winners and losers. Both categorical and 
comparative stances are meaningful, and a good theory of justice should ideally 
embrace both—or focus on one, while not completely losing sight of the other. 
 
IV. Utopophobia, Factophobia and the Desiderata on a Theory of Justice 
In this section, I consider lines of disagreement between utopophobes and 
factophobes pitched at the level of the desiderata that a good theory of justice should 
satisfy. Of the desiderata outlined above, I assume that parsimony, consistency and 
explanatory power are relatively uncontroversial. Instead, the lines of debate I focus 
on concern: (i) whether “ought implies can” is a desideratum on a normative theory; 
(ii) if it is, how the “can” should be interpreted; and (iii) whether the evidence we 
offer in support of our theories of justice should involve idealization.  
 
IV.i “Ought implies can” 
Factophobe theorists, contrary to utopophobes, might believe that “ought implies can” 
is not a desideratum on a plausible theory of justice (Cohen 2008, 250–52). As the 
previous section already showed, there is a very simple way of explaining this 
disagreement, by tracing it back to the distinction between evaluative and normative 
theories. As we saw earlier in the chapter, theories of justice that are purely evaluative 
do not set out duties, that is, they do not imply any “oughts.” The desideratum of 
“ought implies can” is thus irrelevant for them.  
                                                
15 I am assuming, in addition, that in this state of affairs individuals have all the rights we think are 
desirable. This contrasts with the earlier case of Tim and Tom, where Tom’s rights to resources were 
only counterfactual.   
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If the disagreement between those who defend and those who question the 
“ought implies can” desideratum is traceable to the earlier one about evaluative vs 
normative theories of justice, nothing more needs to be said about it. Both positions 
are plausible, and (substantively) not mutually exclusive: what matters is clearly 
defining what one means by justice, and why. 
 A deeper disagreement, however, could occur if theorists differed on whether 
“ought implies can” was a plausible constraint on normative theories of justice. To 
my knowledge, nobody in what I have called the factophobes-utopophobes 
controversy explicitly denies that it is. There seems to be general agreement that, from 
a normative perspective, valid “oughts” presuppose “can-s.” There is, however, 
considerable disagreement about how this “can” should be interpreted. In other words, 
there are controversies about what type of “possibility” matters for the elaboration of 
principles of justice. It is to these disagreements that I now turn. 
  
IV.ii Ought implies what sense of “can”? 
“Ought implies can” is typically treated as a constraint on any plausible normative 
theory of justice. If the theory’s prescriptions violate this requirement, they are 
invalid. For instance, imagine again that our theory of justice contained the 
prescription “The state ought to eliminate crime altogether.” On a plausible 
interpretation of “ought implies can,” this prescription is not valid, since, given the 
limits in power and capabilities any imaginable state has, guaranteeing an altogether 
crime-free society is arguably impossible—even for the best of states. Note that the 
imperative at hand, addressed to states, differs from the prescription “Every mentally 
sane member of society ought not to commit crimes.” As a demand on individuals, 
this prescription does not exceed the limits of possibility; but, arguably, it is not 
within the power of a state to make sure that no-one ever commits any crimes. If this 
is right, imposing on a state the duty to eliminate crime is a “moral” mistake, because 
it violates “ought implies can.”16 
 As I have anticipated, there is disagreement about how the “can” in “ought 
implies can” should be interpreted. Utopophobes are often accused of favouring too 
narrow an interpretation, factophobes too permissive an interpretation. This, in turn, 
may be either (i) because, despite focusing on the same sense of possibility in 
interpreting “can,” utopophobes and factophobes hold substantively different views 
about what is possible for human beings in that sense or (ii) because utopophobes and 
factophobes focus on different senses of possibility. In what follows, I consider both 
options in turn. 
 On its broadest interpretation, the “can” in “ought implies can” refers to 
overall human agential possibility, the limits of which are established by reference to 
human nature and the human condition. Theorists who “agree” that this sense of 
“can” is the correct one when it comes to issuing normative prescriptions, may 
disagree on what, substantively, the limits of human agential possibility are (cf. the 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” constraints in Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 
2012, 813).17  
 For instance, it is possible that both Rawls and his political realist critics agree 
on what sense of possibility matters in the interpretation of “ought implies can”—i.e. 
overall human agential possibility—but have different views about human nature and 
its limits. Rawls (1996) thinks that human beings living under free institutions are 
                                                
16 Cf. Weinberg’s contribution [ask Editors] 
17 For further discussion of feasibility, see Räikkä (1998) and Mason (2004).  
 12 
bound to develop different, conflicting conceptions of the good, but may still be able 
to agree on a conception of political justice. In addition, Rawls seems to suppose that 
it is possible for citizens to conduct political affairs in a non-corrupt manner. Realist 
critics of Rawls disagree. They believe it is in the nature of politics—and, 
presumably, human beings—that any set of principles for governing society will be 
deeply contested, that power corrupts, and that the best a political theory can do is 
offering principles for managing conflict and corruption (e.g. Galston 2010; Williams 
2005; Mouffe 2005). From this realist perspective, one could argue, Rawls’s 
principles are problematic in that they fail to meet the “ought implies can” 
requirement—they presuppose possibilities that are simply ruled out by the nature of 
politics. From the perspective of a Rawlsian scholar, realist principles are equally 
problematic, not because they fail to meet the “ought implies can” constraint, but 
because they are excessively conservative. 
 Similarly, the “international” Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics might agree 
on how “ought implies can” should be interpreted—i.e. as referring to general 
constraints of human nature and the human condition—but disagree about what 
human beings, by their nature, can do. In Rawls’s (1999b) view, a free international 
order is a pluralistic one, containing not only liberal societies. In addition, Rawls 
believes it virtually impossible to implement demanding redistributive principles 
across borders, on the assumption that, psychologically, human solidarity has limits. 
Cosmopolitans, by contrast, disagree, and seem to imply that it is possible to have 
both a fully liberal international order and one governed by egalitarian distributive 
principles (e.g. Pogge 2001). For them, Rawls’s principles are unduly conservative, 
while for a Rawlsian, cosmopolitan principles set out prescriptions that human beings 
simply cannot realize. 
 Who is correct? It is hard to tell. It is extremely difficult to establish what the 
limits of human possibility are: any such attempt is bound to be speculative. As Rawls 
himself acknowledges: 
 
… [T]he limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser 
extent change political and social institutions and much else. Hence we have to rely on 
conjecture and speculation, arguing as best we can that the social world we envision is feasible 
and might actually exist, if not now then at some future time under happier circumstances 
(Rawls 1999b, 12). 
 
There are, however, important moral reasons for continuing to do work on the more 
utopian end of the spectrum—where the limits of possibility are “thinnest”—at least 
so long as the possibility of realizing justice in this more utopian form has not been 
conclusively excluded. This is because we do not want non-conclusively-justified 
pessimism about human nature to make our theories of justice less ambitious, and our 
ideals more status-quo biased. Charles Beitz has put the point particularly well, in his 
defence of cosmopolitan justice: 
 
Unless international cooperation according to the principles of justice can be shown to be 
infeasible, limiting the scope of the principles to national societies on the grounds that 
international cooperation does not exist today … would arbitrarily favour the status quo 
(Beitz 1983, 595, added emphasis). 
 
If prescriptions have not been proven impossible, and they strike us as highly morally 
desirable, then we have good reasons to continue to defend them. Abandoning them 
on the grounds that “they might be impossible” would run the risk of turning this 
alleged impossibility into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Valentini 2014; cf. Brownlee 
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2010; Gheaus 2013). For example, giving up on the ideal of global distributive justice 
on the grounds that it is (allegedly) motivationally impossible for human beings to 
sustain a global redistributive system—something only speculative at this point—
would make the realization of global distributive justice all the more remote. 
 In sum, if utopophobes and factophobes agree that the “can” in “ought implies 
can” refers to overall human agential possibility, but disagree about what is possible 
for humans, I provisionally side with factophobes. To the extent that the impossibility 
of X (where X is a justice-based prescription) has not been conclusively proven, we 
have good moral reasons for assuming optimism, and continue to theorize on the 
more utopian end of the spectrum.  
 But what if utopophobes and factophobes disagree about what types of 
constraints should count when interpreting the “can” in “ought implies can”? Some 
utopophobes, in particular, may be tempted to deliberately include “soft constraints,” 
namely those institutional, cultural and motivational constraints that “place limits on 
what people are comparatively more likely to do, but the limits are neither permanent 
nor absolute” (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 813). By doing so, however, 
utopophobes would be abandoning “ought implies can” strictly conceived, and 
subscribe to a weaker alternative, such as “ought implies reasonably likely” (for 
discussion see Estlund 2008, 265; 2014, 124). I am not so sure I have personally 
encountered theorists who explicitly adopt this alternative, but if they do, I suspect 
this is for purely strategic reasons. At any rate, I agree with David Estlund’s (implicit) 
suggestion that assuming “ought implies reasonably likely” is a legitimate move only 
to the extent that it is made for strategic purposes (Estlund 2011, 217–18).  
For example, the “egalitarian party” might firmly believe that high-earners 
ought to pay 75% tax on income in excess of 250000 GBP on grounds of justice. 
However, members of the party also know that such a tax proposal would (i) scare the 
electorate and (ii) not work. Even if the party won, any attempt to implement the 
reform would result in capital flowing away from the country, with egalitarian aims 
remaining even more unfulfilled than with a lower tax rate. In those circumstances, it 
makes strategic sense to act as if “ought implies reasonably likely,” and propose a tax 
rate on high income that the rich are likely to tolerate and comply with. This, 
however, would not imply that the wealthy ought not to pay 75% tax, only that their 
likely weakness of will, or immorality, makes a policy conforming with their real 
duties destined to fail. Estlund is thus correct that ought—strictly conceived—does 
not imply reasonably likely. If utopophobes hold this view, or something in its 
vicinity, they are mistaken.18 
 Finally, there are disagreements between factophobes and utopophobes that, 
despite seemingly reflecting different interpretations of “can” in the “ought implies 
can” desideratum, most likely amount to substantive moral disagreements. Consider, 
in this respect, the Rawls-Cohen debate on incentives (Cohen 2000, chap. 8). In 
Rawls’s view, inequalities necessary to incentivize talented individuals to be more 
productive—thereby benefitting the worst off overall—are consistent with the 
difference principle. Cohen disagrees. In his view, individuals committed to the 
difference principle ought not to selfishly seek additional rewards to use their talents 
most productively. Now, one might think that the disagreement between Rawls and 
Cohen is ultimately traceable to different interpretations of “ought implies can.” For 
                                                
18 Estlund’s (2011) discussion is built around an analogous example, and focuses on Joseph Carens’ 
“Pretax Max” scheme, which involves a requirement on individuals to maximize their pretax income 
even under a tax regime involving full egalitarian redistribution. 
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Cohen, ought implies “can” in the strict sense, for Rawls ought implies “reasonably 
likely”—i.e. since the talented are unlikely to be maximally productive without 
incentives, maximal productivity without incentives cannot be a demand of justice. 
Consequently, Rawls’s stance is implausible, unless looked at from a strategic 
perspective. 
But a different, and perhaps more accurate, interpretation of this disagreement 
sees it as a moral one, whereby—for Rawls, but not Cohen—even though it would be 
possible for individuals to act in the spirit of the difference principle, asking them to 
do so would be undesirable. This is because, in their private lives, individuals should 
be in a position to freely choose their occupation on the basis of personal preference, 
as opposed to a “comprehensive” commitment to benefiting the worst off (Meckled-
Garcia 2002, 788). On this reading, the Cohen-Rawls disagreement is similar to the 
disagreement between, say, Peter Singer (1972) and his opponents. The reason why 
many object to the idea that we are obligated to prevent bad things from happening 
when doing so does not involve a sacrifice of equivalent moral weight is not that it is 
impossible to act on this principle, but that acting on it would make one’s life much 
less rewarding and valuable: it would be morally undesirable. When disagreements 
hinge on such desirability considerations, we are leaving the “meta-level” of what 
desiderata a good theory of justice should meet, and going back to the first-order 
substantive level of what would make the world (more) just (for similar 
considerations, see the discussion of personal prerogatives in Estlund 2011, 222–
23).19  
 In sum, the only plausible interpretation of “ought implies can” (for non-
strategic reasons) refers to agential possibility. To be sure, there is disagreement about 
what is possible for human beings to do. In such cases of disagreement, I have argued, 
we have moral reasons for taking an optimistic stance on human possibility, namely 
for siding with more “utopo-phile” theorists.  
 
IV.iii Idealization 
Another line of discussion dividing utopophobes and factophobes concerns the use of 
idealizations in theorizing about justice. What are “idealizations”? Technically 
speaking, they are falsities (O’Neill 1996, 40–41). A proposition is idealized with 
respect to a particular domain if it implies falsehoods about that domain. For example, 
the claim that “everyone in society pays their taxes” is an idealization, to the extent 
that, in any society I am aware of, at least a minimum of tax evasion exists.  
The use of false—counterfactual—assumptions (i.e. idealizations) in 
theorizing about justice abounds. Consider the following examples: (i) Rawls’s 
original position thought-experiment, with its assumption of full compliance and its 
carefully crafted characterization of the “parties”; (ii) Dworkin’s shipwreck scenario, 
where individuals stranded on an island have to bid for resources using clamshells as 
their currency; (iii) assumptions about full knowledge or lack of uncertainty made in 
discussions about just-war theory and the justifiability of torture; (iv) reference to 
“manna from heaven,” twin earths, four-eyed human beings, and utility monsters in 
theorizing about justice. 
 Utopophobes worry that appeal to such idealizations is problematic in that it 
renders theories of justice either useless or counter-productive. Factophobes, on the 
other hand, insist on such idealizations being a necessary component of any good 
                                                
19 Estlund (2011, 223) explains that Carens himself would reject a duty to maximize one’s pre-tax 
income under an egalitarian tax scheme on grounds of overdemandingness (see the previous footnote). 
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theory of justice—their function is to either simplify our subject matter (a necessary 
theoretical move), or to make sure that theories of justice do not simply reproduce the 
status quo (Stemplowska 2008).  
 In order to assess the idealization-anti-idealization debate, we first need to 
understand at what level of theorizing the use of idealizations occurs. This is typically 
at the level of the provision of evidence in support of a theory, as opposed to the 
theory itself. Rawls’s original position thought experiment, for example, is not “part 
of his theory of justice,” i.e. of the body of propositions following from his principles, 
but part of the evidence brought forward in support of it. It is evidence in favour of 
his two principles—Rawls claims—that they are the output of the original position 
(List and Valentini forthcoming; Sangiovanni forthcoming, online early, 20). 
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin’s shipwreck scenario is not “part of his theory” of equality 
of resources, but is instead offered as evidence in support of that theory.  
 This is an important point. Literally speaking, the claim that a theory of justice 
is problematic because it is idealized is uninformative: it means that the theory is 
problematic because it is false. When critics of idealization make this claim, what 
they implicitly suggest is that the use of idealizations (often in the form of counter-
factuals) in the evidence backing theories of justice inevitably causes the theories in 
question to deliver false recommendations for the world in which we live (Mills 2005; 
McCarthy 2004; Farrelly 2007; cf. O’Neill 1996, 41). The latter is a more informative 
claim, but is it correct? Does the use of judgements about idealized scenarios as 
evidence in support of a theory of justice inevitably make that theory implausible “for 
us”? 
 I believe not. Whether the use of idealized scenarios in supporting theories of 
justice is problematic or not depends on the particular case at hand. There are 
examples in which the relevant idealizations do not lead to problematic prescriptive 
(or evaluative) judgements, and examples in which they do.  
For the former case, consider Rawls’s “full compliance” assumption. Its 
function, as A. John Simmons (2010, 8–9) explains, is to make sure that the choice 
between different principles of justice is genuinely determined by the merits of these 
principles, and not influenced by concerns about citizens not acting in line with them. 
These concerns, as we have seen, should be “strategically” taken into account when 
designing effective institutions, but not when choosing principles of justice. Similarly, 
consider Rawls’s idealized description of the parties in the original position as 
rational, mutually disinterested and ignorant of their social class, talents and 
conceptions of the good. The role of these idealizations is to lend support to Rawls’s 
principles by demonstrating that they would be selected under conditions that model a 
fully fair agreement.  
Do these idealizations undermine the plausibility of Rawls’s theory, when this 
is applied to the real world? It seems not. Rawls’s principles appear to deliver 
plausible prescriptions for institutions governing partially compliant, flesh-and-blood 
human beings. For instance, some utopophobes’ protestations that, by abstracting 
away from the injustices of race and gender discrimination, Rawls’s arguments in 
support of his principles make his theory unable plausibly to address racial and gender 
injustice is poorly substantiated (Mills 2005; McCarthy 2004). In a society 
characterized by considerable informal racial discrimination, Rawls’s “fair equality of 
opportunity principle” might well demand the introduction of affirmative action 
policies or a quota system, namely (at least prima facie) plausible remedies (Valentini 
2009). The complaints of the critics, in Rawls’s case, are ill founded. 
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More generally, it is not clear why the fact that certain principles are chosen 
under idealized assumptions should make those principles morally (as opposed to 
strategically) ill-suited for real-world circumstances. By way of analogy, consider a 
real-world negotiation between parties with different bargaining power, which 
delivers an agreement heavily skewed in favour of the powerful. Now ask what 
agreement would have resulted from a fair negotiation, under conditions of equal 
bargaining power, and without concerns about actors’ likely non-compliance with the 
agreed terms and conditions. Why should the outcome of the latter (hypothetical) 
negotiation not offer a plausible moral yardstick for evaluating the results of the 
counterpart, real-world negotiation?  
 This, however, is not to say that anti-idealization theorists’ complaints are 
always without substance. It is also not difficult to see how resort to idealized 
scenarios, and our moral convictions in them, might give rise to problematic 
prescriptions for real-world circumstances. This tends to happen when the nature of 
the evidence in support of a theory does not match its advertised scope. Let me offer 
one example. Consider a theory of the just conduct of war (jus in bello), whose 
prescriptions are supported on the basis of our considered judgements in somewhat 
counter-factual scenarios, i.e. scenarios that would not normally obtain in wars as we 
know them.20 The scenarios in question involve, e.g. no uncertainty about (i) who is a 
soldier and who isn’t; (ii) who is going to fire and when; (iii) the effects of one’s own 
actions, and no special psychological distress compared to “normal” circumstances in 
which one’s life is not at risk. 
Prescriptions (“oughts”) of jus in bello that fit our considered judgements in 
these kinds of counter-factual scenarios, and are only tested by reference to them, may 
be problematic if applied to real-world war situations, which are characterized by 
considerable uncertainty, as well as psychological distress. Using evidence 
exclusively derived from such “sanitized” war scenarios to support a theory the 
official scope of which includes real-world cases is thus risky. Note, however, that 
this difficulty can be avoided without altogether abandoning the use of idealized 
scenarios, but rather by making sure that the official scope of a theory—i.e. the set of 
circumstances to which its prescriptions (or evaluations) are meant to apply—and the 
evidence used in support of it “match.” 
 My arguments so far suggest that, contrary to what utopophobes argue, appeal 
to evidence developed in “idealized scenarios” need not undermine the validity of a 
theory of justice. This conclusion, I believe, needs to be somewhat qualified. 
Specifically, it holds with respect to “highly idealized” scenarios, but not with respect 
to “outlandish” ones. “Highly idealized” scenarios are ones that, despite not reflecting 
reality, are in principle compatible with it. They depict the highly unlikely, but not the 
straightforwardly impossible. 
 “Outlandish” scenarios, as Jakob Elster (2011) describes them, instead present 
us with worlds that simply exceed the limits of what we believe is possible, given the 
limits of human nature. They involve, for instance, people with four eyes, hundreds of 
legs, utility monsters, and omniscient beings.21 Do the intuitions developed in these 
                                                
20  Some contemporary just-war theorists (especially from the so-called “revisionist” camp) are 
sometimes criticized for not fully acknowledging the realities of war. My discussion, here, is purely 
illustrative: I do not have any specific just-war theorist in mind. For discussion of the relationship 
between contemporary methodological debates in political theory and just-war theory see Lazar and 
Valentini (n.d.).  
21 As Elster (2011, 244) explains, the humanly impossible features of these scenarios need to be 
“essential” to them for the scenarios to count as properly outlandish. If reference to “manna from 
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scenarios constitute sound evidence for the development of a theory of justice? Here I 
side with Elster (2011, 250), and conclude that they do not, simply because I doubt 
that it is even possible for us plausibly to imagine and understand what the scenarios 
depict. We just do not know what it would be like to have one hundred legs or four 
eyes. We do not know what society would look like in that case, how much value we 
would attach to our bodies, and how we would relate to them.  
 Idealizations in general are not to be avoided—only treated with care—but 
idealizations that result in outlandish scenarios are not to be trusted. This conclusion 
feeds back into our previous discussion about the appropriate scope of an account of 
justice. Whether normative or evaluative, a plausible theory of justice should limit 
itself to covering humanly possible combinations of facts (even if these combinations 
are far from being instantiated in the actual world). Given how wide the scope of 
human possibility is, this does not appear to be such a concession for “utopo-phile” 
theorizing to make. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have surveyed the utopophobia vs factophobia controversy, and 
systematized the disagreements between different groups of theorists by reference to 
(i) a given notion of a theory of justice and (ii) an illustrative account of the desiderata 
any good theory of justice so defined should meet. My discussion has revealed that, 
for many of the most prominent lines of this controversy, neither utopophobes nor 
factophobes are “right”: both positions are plausible and not mutually exclusive. In 
fact, only “extreme” versions of utopophobia and factophobia are to be avoided.  
 I have also argued that, when it comes to deciding how to interpret the “ought 
implies can” proviso constraining normative theories of justice, we should take 
human nature as definitive of the limits of possibility, and adopt an optimistic stance 
of what these limits are. In other words, the burden of proof of showing that 
something morally desirable is in fact impossible falls on the sceptic. In this respect, 
we should thus not be utopophobic, namely we should not be afraid of theorizing 
under assumptions that appear highly unlikely. I have also argued that the use of 
idealizations in the evidence supporting a theory of justice is not problematic so long 
as the idealizations appealed to (i) match the “official scope” of the theory in question 
and (ii) are not outlandish.  
 Taken together, the latter two conclusions may be said to suggest an 
orientation in political philosophy which, following Rawls (1999b), could be 
described as “realistically utopian,” stretching the limits of human possibility far and 
wide, without falling into “the outlandish.”  
  
                                                                                                                                      
heaven” in a scenario can be easily replaced with “natural resources,” that scenario does not qualify as 
genuinely outlandish.  
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